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Abstract
It is well-known that Newton’s theory of gravity, commonly held to de-
scribe a gravitational force, can be recast in a geometrical form: Newton-
Cartan theory. It is less well-known that general relativity, an apparently
geometrical theory, can be reformulated in such a way that it resembles a
force theory; teleparallel gravity does just this. This raises questions. One
of these concerns theoretical underdetermination. I argue that these theo-
ries do not, in fact, represent cases of worrying underdetermination. On
close examination, the alternative formulations are best interpreted as pos-
tulating the same spacetime ontology. In accepting this, we see that the
ontological commitments of these theories cannot be directly deduced from
their mathematical form. The geometrical nature of a gravitational theory
is not a straightforward consequence of anything internal to that theory as a
theory of gravity. Rather, it essentially relies on the rest of nature (the non-
gravitational interactions) conspiring to choose the appropriate set of inertial
frames.
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Introduction
A popular account of the development of gravitational theories might go some-
thing like this: Newtonian theory casts gravity as a force. That is, gravity causes
objects to deviate from the trajectories that they would follow if they were force-
free. Gravity is not connected to space and time; forces and fields propagate in
fixed Euclidean space. With the advent of general relativity, however, we realised
that gravity was best seen as a manifestation of spacetime geometry, and the force
that was gravity faded from physics. Instead, it was suggested, massive bodies
moved towards each other because spacetime itself was curved by their presence.
Thus the effects of gravity are not, in fact, the effects of a force. Bodies freely
falling in a gravitational field are held to be force-free.
If the account were somewhat more sophisticated, it might mention that the
conceptual move was prompted by a move to a very different mathematical form
for the theory. While Newtonian Gravity is written in the language of forces,
potentials, and fields, general relativity is written in the language of differential
geometry.
As far as the historian is concerned, this might be a reasonable, if simplified,
summary. However, from the perspective of the philosopher of science, the sit-
uation is far more complicated. Philosophers and physicists have long known
that general relativity’s uniqueness does not lie in its mathematical format alone:
Newtonian gravity can also be written in the language of differential geometry.
Moreover, it may be reformulated in this language in such a way that Newtonian
gravity, as in GR, appears to be a manifestation of geometrical spacetime struc-
ture. This account is known as Newton-Cartan theory (NCT). All this is familiar,
and has been examined in depth in the literature. What is less well-known, at
least among philosophers, is that general relativity has been given an analogous
makeover, but in the opposite direction. Teleparallel gravity (TPG) reproduces the
empirical content of GR, but in a format that more closely resembles the gauge
theories of the standard model than gravity does. Its proponents claim that it re-
stores to gravity its status as a force.
We thus find ourselves in a situation altogether less simple than a quick flick
through the textbooks might suggest. If a Newtonian universe admits of geomet-
rical gravity, and a general relativistic universe allows gravity as a force, then we
face several challenges to our standard conception of physics. One obvious worry
is that we have here physical examples of the conventionalist thesis: it seems we
must accept that the geometry of spacetime is underdetermined by data or else
accept that it is not an objective feature of the world. I argue here that such a con-
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clusion is not warranted; the full structure of our complete set of physical theories
and the data they entail is enough to choose between geometries. This is because
the concept of an inertial frame is both more central, and more robust, than the
literature typically gives it credit for.
However, the existence of formulations of gravitational theories with differ-
ent geometrical structure poses a challenge to popular ideas about the source of
general relativity’s (and Newton-Cartan theory’s) geometrical nature. In light of
alternative formulations, we must conclude that a theory’s geometrical nature is
not a straightforward consequence of any formal aspects of the theory qua the-
ory of gravitation. Rather, it essentially relies on the rest of nature conspiring
to choose the appropriate set of inertial frames. That is, the non-gravitational
interactions must confirm that the straightest lines, the geodesics, of our gravita-
tional theory, are indeed the straightest trajectories in spacetime itself. In GR, this
amounts to the other forces obeying the strong equivalence principle, and taking
their simplest form in free-fall frames. While this apparent fact is encoded by the
minimal coupling principle, it is, in a sense, external to the barest mathematical
form of the theory.
This paper divides naturally into two parts, the first on Newton-Cartan theory
and the second on teleparallel gravity. In both the Newtonian and the relativistic
cases we are presented with pairs of theories, one of which incorporates gravita-
tional effects into the connection, and the other of which apparently postulates a
division between the connection and the gravitational field. In both cases, I shall
argue that there are grounds for not taking the gravity/inertia split seriously. Even
the theory that appears ‘non-geometrical’ can be interpreted as postulating the
freely-falling frames as inertial frames. In the case of Newtonian gravity, there
is also a second option: it might be the case that non-gravitational phenomena
pick out inertial frames and thus impose a gravity/inertia split. However, in the
teleparallel case, there is no such option: the only candidates for inertial frames
within the theory are those of general relativity.
Before beginning, it is worth making a few comments about the relationship
between theory equivalence and underdetermination. In a standard account, un-
derdetermination worries come about in a relatively straightforward way. It is pro-
posed that it is possible to have two distinct theories that make identical empirical
predictions. Assuming (quite reasonably), that different theories entail different
realist commitments, such a possibility is taken to undermine scientific realism.
However, this account presupposes a robust understanding of the circumstances
under which two theories are distinct. One might therefore think that that a defi-
nition of theoretical equivalence is crucial to any examination of underdetermina-
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tion.1 In examining the pairs of theories at issue here, it would be easy to get lost
in this debate; if we cannot start examining underdetermination problems without
first defining what it is for two theories to be equivalent, more specific debates
seem unlikely to get off the ground. However, with further thought, it seems that
our assessment of the underdetermination thesis should not rest on this issue; af-
ter all, what is at stake here is the idea that we might have empirically equivalent
accounts which differ in their ontological commitments; even if we show that two
such accounts should not count as distinct theories, the ontological underdetermi-
nation remains.
I will therefore steer clear of directly the tempting, but thorny question of
whether NCT and NG, for example, constitute distinct theories. Given that I will
argue that we do not, in fact, have automatic ontological divergence in the cases
at hand, it is natural to view the NCT as a reformulation of NG, and TPG as
a reformulation of GR. I will therefore often refer to formulations, rather than
theories, but nothing in particular rides on this. If the terminology is correct, it
is correct as a result of the arguments presented here, and not a presupposition of
them.
1 Newton-Cartan Theory
There is no lack of philosophical literature examining Newton-Cartan theory, and
the majority of it dates back 30 to 50 years. Why, then, revisit such a well-worn
topic? For one thing, the advent of teleparallel gravity makes possible some inter-
esting comparisons between Newtonian theories and GR that cast the equivalence
between Newton-Cartan theory and Newtonian gravity in a new light. For another,
I argue that emphasising inertial structure leads to an argument against theoretical
underdetermination. This argument has occasionally been hinted at, but not, to
my knowledge, made explicit. I hold that, despite what the mathematical form of
the theory seems to suggest, in an empirical situation that would confirm Newton-
Cartan theory, Newtonian gravity should be interpreted as postulating the same
set of inertial frames as its more ‘geometrical’ relative.
I will begin by going over the details of NCT, making explicit the precise form
of the theory that is under consideration. I will then examine the case for under-
determination, looking particularly at whether NCT and NG should be regarded
as giving the same empirical results, and at how NG should be interpreted. I will
1See, for example, [10]
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conclude that, if they are taken to be empirically equivalent, they postulate the
same spacetime structure, and, if we insist that they represent different spacetime
structures, then we should regard the two theories as empirically inequivalent. We
therefore do not have a case of underdetermination. Finally, I will draw some
parallels between the case here and the situation in GR.
1.1 The Theory
With the hindsight provided by general relativity, it is easy to ask the following
question of Newton’s gravitational theory: Why, given that inertial and gravita-
tional mass are equivalent in NG, just as they are in GR, should we not make the
same conceptual identification in the one as we do in the other? Why not iden-
tify gravitational and inertial structure in Newtonian dynamics? The answer is,
of course, that, at least when considering NG in isolation from other theories, it
is perfectly possible to make this identification and thus cast NG in geometrical
terms; the result of this reformulation is Newton-Cartan theory.
To convince ourselves that it is possible to introduce a connection that will
‘geometrise’ Newtonian gravity, simply look at the Newtonian equation of motion
for a particle in free-fall in some gravitational potential φ:
d2xj
dt2
+
∂φ
∂xj
= 0. (1)
(j = 1, 2, 3)
We may view this path as a geodesic with affine parameter λ, which we may
take to represent the time read by a clock moving along the geodesic. In our
framework, time is absolute, and thus λ will be a linear function of absolute time:
λ = at+ b. This gives us:
d2t
dλ2
= 0 (2)
d2xj
dλ2
+
∂φ
∂xj
(
dt
dλ
)2 = 0 (3)
By comparison recall the geodesic equation:
d2xα
dλ2
+ Γαβγ
dxβ
dλ
dxγ
dλ
= 0. (4)
this gives a connection with coefficients:
Γj00 =
∂φ
∂xj
. (5)
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All other connection coefficients vanish. Inserting these coefficients into the Rie-
mann tensor is straightforward; curvature is given by:
Rj0k0 = −Rj00k =
∂2φ
∂xj∂xk
. (6)
with all other Rαβγδ vanishing. It is therefore clear that this connection, unlike the
usual affine connection in standard neo-Newtonian spacetime, is curved. More-
over, by contracting to the Ricci tensor, we get a reformulation of the Poisson
equation in geometrical terms:
∇2φ = 4piρ (7)
becomes:
R00 = 4piρ, (8)
where ρ is the usual mass density function.
The connection, Riemann and Ricci tensors above encode all the content of
NG; this rather swift and easy process casts Newtonian gravity in an apparently
geometrical form. However, aside from an awareness that a connection whose
curvature is influenced by mass has been introduced, we know relatively little
about the theory’s geometrical structure. Let us recast the theory into the language
of differential geometry.
Newton-Cartan theory introduces a classical spacetime 〈M,hab, ta,∇a, ρ〉, where
M is a smooth 4-dimensional differentiable manifold, hab is a Euclidean spatial
metric (given by a tensor field of signature (0,1,1,1)), ta is a temporal metric, with
signature (1,0,0,0) and ∇a is a derivative operator associated with the connection
introduced above. ρ takes its usual significance as the mass density function. The
temporal metric is stipulated to be orthogonal to the spatial metric:
habtb = 0, (9)
and the connection is constrained to be compatible with both spatial and temporal
metrics:
∇chab = ∇atb = 0. (10)
In more general form, the Poisson equation (8) becomes:
Rab = 4piρtatb. (11)
For a particle with some 4-velocity ξa, the geodesic equation has the familiar
form:
ξa∇aξb = 0 (12)
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Other curvature constraints may be introduced by raising indices with the spatial
metric hab.2 We now add the constraint that the connection is ‘curl-free’, needed to
ensure that the theory provides the appropriate c→∞ limit for GR (see Malament
1986):
R
[ac]
[bd] = 0, (13)
where [...] represent antisymmetrization. With conditions (9)-(13) in place, we
have the minimal version of NCT. This posits a spacetime with a flat spatial met-
ric and an orthogonal universal time function which will be read by any clock
traversing the spacetime. As with standard NG, this gives us a spacetime foliated
into 3-D Euclidean spaces coordinatised by an absolute time. However, unlike in
NG, the connection here, although spatially flat, possesses curvature along time-
like vectors. This curvature is affected by mass distribution, and explains acceler-
ations of bodies relative to one another in the presence of mass.
This form of NCT, which Bain [1] calls “weak” Newton-Cartan theory, is the
c → ∞ limit of GR.3 However, the constraints on the connection given by equa-
tions 9-11 and 13 do not sufficiently restrict the class of connections to provide
either an absolute standard of rotation, or an absolute standard of acceleration.
Given that global accelerations are unobservable in Newtonian gravity, the fact
that the theory does not give an absolute standard of acceleration is, if anything,
an advantage. However, the failure to provide a rotation standard is more serious,
and prevents “weak” NCT from being equivalent to Newtonian gravity, and, for
that matter, from being a well-defined physical theory.
In order to see that weak NCT will not be empirically equivalent to standard
Newtonian gravity, consider the fact that, while absolute linear accelerations are
not observable in NG, absolute rotations are. The water in Newton’s bucket is
predicted to be just as concave in empty space as it is in our own world. Leav-
ing aside the substantivalist/relationist debate concerning whether this is a correct
prediction of the theory, let us simply note that, in order for NCT to be empir-
ically equivalent to NG, it too must introduce an absolute standard of rotation.
In the weak form of the theory developed above, there are too many degrees of
freedom in the connection for it to distinguish between straight, or non-rotating,
trajectories, and twisted, or rotating trajectories; the class of allowed connections
2The contravariant equivalent, hab does not exist in these theories, and we therefore have no
means of lowering indices. The index-rasing procedure given by the spatial metric is thus not
quite the same as rasing indices using a full spacetime metric like gab. The above procedure is
best viewed a prescription for creating tensors whose covariant indices are purely spatial.
3That this is the case has been demonstrated by Malament [14] and Ehlers [6, 7].
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is simply too large. In order to solve this problem, we may introduce the following
constraint on the curvature of the Newton-Cartan connection:4
Rabcd = 0 (14)
This condition was first introduced by Trautman [21]. Bain refers to it as the
rotation standard, and calls the theory that results from adding it “strong” Newton-
Cartan theory. A connection obeying this constraint can differentiate between
‘twisted’ and ‘non-twisted’ world lines - that is, the connection picks out some
particular class of reference frames as non-rotating.
How physically meaningful is the introduction of the above? It is tempting to
view it as a mere coordinate constraint; some arbitrary selection of a set of coordi-
nate systems. Misner, Thorne and Wheeler [15, p.294], do not explicitly introduce
the curvature constraint above. Rather, they simply note that time-dependent ro-
tations must be forbidden if we are to restrict the symmetry group to the Galilean
group.5 This method makes the restriction seem like a mere coordinate prescrip-
tion, devoid of physical content. However, the introduction of the rotation stan-
dard is physically meaningful. It amounts to the introduction of a piece of absolute
(non-dynamical) spacetime structure that has physical effects.
In fact, this rotation standard is not just physical, but essential if NCT is to be
a well-defined physical theory. To see this, note that the restriction imposed on
the connection by the rotation standard is just that, a restriction. As such, the con-
nections allowed by strong NCT are a subset of those allowed by weak NCT. Now
consider a situation in which the entire universe is put into a rotating state. Strong
NCT, which, like NG, distinguishes such motion from non-accelerating motion,
will predict a divergence of the inertial paths of particles. What will weak NCT
predict? The connection that produces the divergence is a solution of the equa-
tions of weak NCT, but not the only one; weak NCT also allows for connections
that make global rotations unobservable. As such, weak NCT does not always
4The rotation standard is not the only way to bring NCT empirically into line with NG. The
symmetry group of NCT may be radically restricted by the introduction of ‘island universe’ bound-
ary conditions; that is, by the assumption that spacetime is asymptotically flat. If we impose the
same boundary conditions on standard Newtonian gravity, then both theories have as their sym-
metry group the Galilean group; both rotations and accelerations are absolute. However, this
assumption is unrealistic and introduces an unobservable absolute standard of acceleration. The
variations of NCT and NG that result from this addition are therefore unattractive compared to the
types considered here.
5The rotation standard does not go this far; it only restricts the symmetry to the so-called
Maxwell group, which includes linear accelerations
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provide determinate solutions for a given state of motion of the universe. More
formally, in the absence of the rotation standard, NCT does not possess a classical
Lagrangian density, a Hamiltonian density, or a unambiguous phase space.6 De-
spite being a limit of general relativity, weak NCT is simply not a well-defined
physical theory, let alone an empirically equivalent competitor to NG.
1.2 Underdetermination
In order to determine whether NCT and NG constitute a case of underdetermina-
tion, we must ask two questions. First, are they empirically equivalent? Second,
do they diverge in their ontological commitments. I will argue that if the answer
to the first question is yes, then the answer to the second is no, and vice versa. As
a result, no underdetermination obtains. Let us see how this works.
First, we should note that weak NCT, as noted above, is not empirically equiv-
alent to NG because it fails to make determinate predictions in cases (a rotating
bucket in an empty universe), in which NG makes determinate predictions. There-
fore, in evaluating empirical equivalence, we must consider strong NCT. Once we
move to the case of strong NCT, we do seem to have empirical equivalence, at
least insofar as gravitational phenomena are concerned. Strong NCT and NG
make identical predictions for the behaviour of massive particles under gravity.
This is why they are generally taken to be empirically equivalent. To see this, we
may note that not only may we derive the NCT Poisson equation (11), from the
standard Newtonian Poisson equation (7), but, with the aid of the rotation stan-
dard, we may also derive (7) from (11).7 However, it is not clear what we should
say about their predictions for non-gravitational phenomena. Suppose we discover
massless particles in a Newtonian universe. How do we expect these to behave?
In the absence of an interpretation of NCT and NG, it is far from clear. If we
insist that the connections in each theory represent inertial structure, then it seems
we should expect each theory to make different predictions for the trajectories of
free, massless particles; empirical equivalence is broken. However, I will argue in
what follows that there is also another path: we can refrain from insisting that the
connections in both theories must represent inertial structure.
Let us turn now to the reason that NCT and NG are generally held to postulate
different spacetime structures. While NCT has a single connection, NG divides
this into an inertial connection and a gravitational field:
6See [2].
7For a proof of this, see [1, p.366-372].
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Γ′abc = Γ
a
bc + h
ad∇dφtbtc (15)
A standard reading holds that, from the perspective of NG, there is a unique cor-
rect way to effect the split described above; at any spacetime point, the value of
the gravitational field is specified by the theory (given initial conditions). From
the perspective of NCT, on the other hand, there is no preferred way to make the
split. This reflects the fact, noted earlier, that NG holds to an absolute, global
standard of linear acceleration, whereas NCT does not; acceleration is defined
locally with respect to inertial frames. As a result, NG has a way of specifying
gravitational acceleration relative to the background inertial frames. On the one
hand, in NG, we have models 〈M,hab, ta,∇a, φ, ρ〉, where∇a is a flat affine con-
nection, and φ is the gravitational potential. On the other hand, in NCT, we have
models 〈M,hab, ta,∇a, ρ〉, where ∇a is a dynamical connection with curvature.
The ontologies of the two theories appear to differ both in terms of the nature of
the spacetime structure they posit (dynamical vs. absolute) and in terms of the
existence of the gravitational potential.
Careful consideration of the interpretation of Newtonian gravity gives us rea-
son to resist this conclusion. It is generally accepted that the Newtonian gravi-
tational potential φ is a gauge quantity; the equations of motion are entirely un-
affected by the addition of a constant component to φ. As a result, it is usually
asserted that the real fundamental gravitational entity in NG is the field −∇φ.
However, this entity is also subject to a gauge freedom. Accelerative boosts are
symmetries of the NG equations of motion, and uniform gravitational fields are
unobservable; in a universe in which all bodies are subject to gravity, there is
no unique physically motivated way to make the gravity/inertia split.8 In such a
situation, both the flat affine connection, and the gravitational field, are properly
thought of as gauge quantities; their exact value makes no difference to the equa-
tions of motion; only their sum is empirically significant. It has been frequently
noted (for example, by Friedman [9]) that a great strength of NCT is that it re-
places two gauge quantities with one that is non-gauge. Given that we accept the
8Some might claim that this is not strictly true. If we impose island universe boundary con-
ditions, we can impose a standard of acceleration. However, as noted earlier, such an assumption
is unphysical and cannot be applied in any realistic model of Newtonian cosmology. We could
also use exactly the same conditions to impose a standard of rest, which is not an argument that
most physicists would take seriously. Moreover, the fact that grounds can be found for imposing a
particular gauge does not eliminate the gauge freedom of the entity in question. For a full survey
of the problems caused by insisting on a unique split between gravity and inertia, see [16][13] and
[17].
10
gauge argument for the potential, why not also accept it for the field? On its most
perspicacious reading, NG should never have accepted that different choices of
the inertia/field split corresponded to different possible worlds; the precise value
of the gravitational field has no physical significance.9
In a universe in which all bodies are subject to gravity, the above tack seems
quite persuasive. However, the trouble with picturing counterfactual Newtonian
universes is that our physics is not fully defined: nothing internal to the Newto-
nian picture tells us whether all bodies have mass, or how the non-gravitational
interactions will transform. Let us therefore consider two Newtonian universes,
and see what follows in each.
In the first, Universe A, gravity is universal. All phenomena pick out the
freefall frames as the inertial frames: light rays follow geodesics of the NCT
connection, and the non-gravitational laws look simplest in freely falling frames.
In such a universe, it would be natural to see the Newton-Cartan connection as
representing the inertial structure of spacetime; the theory would be geometrical
in a sense that went beyond its mathematical form (although we might well see
that form as particularly appropriate.) However, such a universe is in no way
at odds with Newtonian gravity. Indeed, if Newton’s light corpuscles possessed
mass, it may well be precisely the universe most naturally posited by the original
theory.
In a second universe, Universe B, both NG and NCT give a full account of
all gravitational phenomena, but the Newton-Cartan connection does not encode
the behaviour of non-gravitational phenomena. In particular, light rays follow
the geodesics of a flat connection, and the laws of electro-magnetism and the
other fundamental forces take their simplest form in reference frames that are not
the free-fall frames. In such a universe, NCT might give a useful and concise
geometrical formulation of our gravitational theory, but we would not associate
its content with space or time. Instead, non-gravitational phenomena would point
to a division between gravity and inertia. In such a case, the gravitational field
ceases to be a gauge quantity; different choices of gravity/inertia split correspond
to different non-gravitational phenomena.
What may we conclude from our two hypothetical universes concerning un-
derdetermination in Newtonian theories? We seem to have two choices. The first
of these, and the one that I prefer, is to hold that NCT and NG need not be au-
tomatically interpreted as postulating different spacetime structure. Rather, the
bare theories simply fail to return a single interpretation when taken in isolation.
9Malament makes the case for this in his [13].
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In order to determine whether their connections in fact represent spacetime struc-
ture, we must look outside Newtonian gravity, to our whole physical theory. If
gravity in fact turns out to be universal, and the non-gravitational laws take their
simplest form with respect to the freely falling frames, then inertial structure is
well-represented by the Newton-Cartan connection. However, this is exactly the
kind of situation in Newtonian gravity in which the inertia/gravity split is not well-
defined, and should not be taken seriously. As a result, a correct reading of Newto-
nian gravity, even in the absence of an awareness of Newton-Cartan theory, should
result in the conclusion that the inertial structure of the theory is represented not
by the connection alone, but by the right hand side of equation 15. As a result,
there is no ontological divergence, and no underdetermination. Likewise, if non-
gravitational phenomena did specify a gravity/inertia split, NCT would remain a
correct theory of gravity, but lose its claim to a spatiotemporal interpretation. If
we accept this option, we see that the spatiotemporal status of the objects of a the-
ory is not merely a matter of the theory’s mathematical form, but rather a subtle
matter of the interplay of those objects with our total physical theory.
The second, to my mind less attractive, option is to insist that both theories
can be interpreted in isolation from a complete account of physics. If we take this
option, we insist that it is part and parcel of Newtonian gravity that it postulates
flat inertial structure, and that Newton-Cartan theory postulates curved structure.
However, if one is genuinely committed to the idea that these connections must
represent a piece of spacetime structure, then one should expect observable man-
ifestations of the resulting inertial structure.10 In this case, we should not see the
two theories as empirically equivalent: they give different predictions for the be-
haviour of massless bodies, and different predictions for the correct form for the
non-gravitational interactions. Even if there turn out to be no massless bodies, the
constraints placed by a given inertial structure on the form of non-gravitational
theories is far from trivial. Thus, even on this reading, we do not have a case of
underdetermination. However, it should be noted that the second reading might
quite well commit us to the idea that Newtonian gravity is disproved by a universe
in which all bodies have mass. Given that this may well have been exactly the
universe that Newton himself envisioned, this makes the position decidedly odd.
10Friedman and Earman also make this point in [5].
12
1.3 Comparing NCT and GR
Of course, we do not live in a Newtonian universe, geometrical gravitation or no.
The above debate is primarily interesting in the light of the kind of universe we do
think we live in, namely, one described by general relativity. We might therefore
wish to ask how a fully geometrical Newton-Cartan theory ( in our second kind of
universe above) compares to general relativity; does the latter still provide a more
geometrical account of gravity?
There is certainly a sense in which GR is the more naturally geometrical the-
ory, in as much as a GR universe is more simply described in geometrical terms
than a Newtonian one. Where NCT must postulate a time metric, a spatial metric,
and a connection as basic geometrical structures, general relativity is so formu-
lated that all relevant structure follows directly from the spacetime metric. NCT
spacetime is a less coherent and cohesive entity than that of GR. However, in
terms of the extent to which each describes gravity as a manifestation of space-
time geometry, there does not appear to be any deep difference. In each case,
gravitational phenomena arise as a result of the structure of spacetime, albeit a
somewhat impoverished structure in the NCT case.
On the other hand, if we compare general relativity to NCT in the absence
of any assumptions about the non-gravitational forces, there is a clear difference.
General relativity comes with a spatiotemporal interpretation as part of the pack-
age; the strong equivalence principle is generally presented as part and parcel of
the theory. But we might formulate NCT in just such a way, if we wished; sim-
ply exchange the Levi-Civita connection for the Newton-Cartan connection in our
minimal coupling rule. In a universe where such a rule applied, one would be
hard-pushed to cite a deep sense in which gravity was less a matter of spacetime
geometry than it is in GR.
Before closing this issue, one more point deserves consideration. In a 1973
paper on Newton-Cartan theory John Earman and Michael Friedman argue that
the geometrization of gravity achieved by GR is both ‘more effective’ and ‘a ge-
ometrization in a very different sense’ from that of NCT. Their basis for this is
that:
If we demand that the affine connection of a relativistic spacetime be
symmetric and compatible with the spacetime metric, there is only
one such connection∇R, and therefore, no possibility of splitting∇R
into an inertial and a gravitational part as there is with the Newtonian
connection∇1. [5, p.355]
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As a result of this, they claim, the very notion of a gravitational force is in-
coherent in GR; there is no method, even an arbitrary one, to divide the gravita-
tional force from inertial effects. We shall see in the next section that technically,
the above is correct. If the affine connection is symmetric, the split is impossi-
ble. However, if we allow a non-symmetric spacetime connection, we can indeed
effect a division of the Levi-Civita connection in a way analogous to standard
Newtonian gravity.
2 Teleparallel Gravity
The elegance of the reduction of gravity to geometry effected by general relativity
(GR) is deeply seductive. But aesthetics, though important, are not everything in
physics. Theoretical physicists have long been aware that it is possible to create
theories similar to GR in their empirical consequences, but which replace the sim-
ple beauty of Einstein’s original theory with an often messier, but perhaps more
useful, gauge theory. Of interest here is teleparallel gravity (TPG), a particular
variant of gravitational gauge theories. In this theory, the Levi-Civita connection
of GR, which has curvature but no torsion, is replaced with a Weitzenbo¨ck con-
nection, with torsion but no curvature. Unlike its cousins, the Poincare´ gauge
theories, teleparallel gravity aims to recreate the results of general relativity ex-
actly. However, it models gravity in a way that resembles a theory like electro-
magnetism much more closely than GR does. As a result, many proponents of
TPG claim that in their theory, gravity is a force, rather than a manifestation of
spacetime geometry.
In fact, TPG is to GR what Newtonian gravity is to Newton-Cartan theory,
and my suggestions here will proceed along the same lines as those in the previ-
ous section. Therefore, I will argue that TPG and GR do not constitute a case of
underdetermination; they in fact postulate the same spacetime structure. If any-
thing, the case for this is more clear cut, because the geometrical structure of these
theories, and its interplay with the rest of physics, is better defined than it was in
the Newtonian case.
Teleparallel gravity has not been much discussed in the philosophical litera-
ture, and considerably more stage setting will therefore be necessary than was the
case in the Newtonian discussion. I will start by introducing the formalism of the
theory, and examining its motivation. I will then argue that, on close examination,
ontological differences between the two theories are illusory. In fact, this new
pair of formulations turns out to have much in common with our two formulations
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of Newtonian gravity, not least in that an emphasis on inertial structure, and not
mathematical form, seems crucial.
2.1 The Theory
Teleparallel gravity has its roots in work simultaneously developed by Einstein
and Cartan [8], concerning the possibility of establishing a theory similar to gen-
eral relativity, but with the feature of absolute parallelism - the possibility de-
termining the angles between distant vectors. It was in this discussion that the
consequences of allowing a connection with torsion were first explored, and both
teleparallel theory, which relies on a connection with torsion alone, and Poincare´
gauge theories, which posit connections with curvature and torsion, have since
been developed on the back of this work.
2.1.1 Curvature, Torsion and geodesics
Teleparallel theory tears apart several geometrical notions that we have, in GR
become used to associating. It also introduces the relatively unfamiliar notion of
torsion. It will therefore be useful, before looking at teleparallel theory, to go over
some GR territory and reexamine some geometrical notions.
The most fundamental field in GR is the metric field, which encodes spa-
tiotemporal distances. However, much of the formal apparatus of GR uses the
Levi-Civita connection, which can be derived from the metric only if one stipu-
lates that the connection must be metric compatible; i.e. that the metric be covari-
antly constant with respect to the connection:
∇ρgµν = 0 (16)
This ensures that the angle between two vectors remains the same under parallel
transport. However, this is not enough to specify the connection uniquely. In
addition, it is necessary to specify that the connection must be symmetric in its
lower indices:
Γρµν = Γ
ρ
νµ (17)
It is this second condition that will be replaced in teleparallel theory. However,
before moving on to the possibility of dropping the condition, it is worthwhile to
look at its original motivation. After all, on the surface, the symmetry condition
appears to have nothing to do with the metric.
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In order to see why the symmetry condition is introduced, we may turn to the
concept of a geodesic. Clearly, this idea is fundamental to general relativity and
its geometrical nature; the idea that freely falling particles follow geodesics of
the metric is an essential component of GR. However, it is important to bear in
mind that there are two notions of geodesic at play in differential geometry. The
first is a metrical notion: geodesics are paths of extremal length; they represent
local maxima and minima of the interval, ds. There is no need to have defined
a connection in order to introduce this notion of geodesic. The second notion of
geodesic centres around the connection: a geodesic is a path that parallel trans-
ports its own tangent vector. This notion is entirely affine; it would allow us to
define geodesics in a space with no metric. In fact, it is the notion of geodesic we
use in Newton-Cartan theory, where no spacetime metric is defined. The motiva-
tion for the symmetry condition is this: The symmetry condition ensures that the
two notions of geodesic coincide.11 In general, even for a metric compatible con-
nection, there will be two sets of geodesics, one associated with the metric, and
another associated with the connection. This will prove important when looking
at teleparallel gravity.
In addition to the notion of geodesic, the concepts of torsion and curvature will
play an important part in what follows, and are worth a closer look. As a result
of its central position in general relativity, most of us are familiar with the ideas
underlying curvature. Because it can be conveniently realised on two-dimensional
surfaces, curvature appears intuitively familiar. This can sometimes obscure the
fact that the connection between pictorial geometry and more formal geometry
can be subtle, because more than one notion of curvature is at play. Nonetheless,
two dimensional surfaces are helpful in seeing that curvature is a measure of the
failure of a vector to return to itself when parallel transported around a closed
loop. Put like this, curvature is obviously a property of the connection, and we
can write the Riemann curvature tensor in terms of the connection:
Rρσµν = ∂µΓ
ρ
νσ − ∂νΓρµσ + ΓρµλΓλνσ − ΓρνλΓλµσ (18)
Obviously, curvature is not the only formal property a connection may possess.
Another is torsion. Torsion is less easy to visualize; it corresponds, not to the
failure of a single vector to come back to itself when transported around a loop,
but to the failure of two vectors to form a parallelogram when parallel transported
along one another:
11For an attractive pictorial demonstration of this, see Misner, Thorne and Wheeler [15, p.248-
251].
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Figure 1: Torsion
Taking two infinitesimal vectors, χα and ζα, first parallel transport χα along
ζα, and then transport ζα along χα. In space with no torsion, the result of these two
processes will be the same; a parallelogram is formed. However, if the connection
has torsion, the parallelogram will not close, as shown in Figure 1. The non-
closure is proportional to torsion. Formally, the torsion tensor is given by:
T λµν = Γ
λ
µν − Γλνµ (19)
As such, torsion is a measure of the antisymmetric part of a connection. Thus,
general relativity’s demand for a symmetric connection amounts to a demand that
the torsion tensor vanish. Teleparallel gravity, on the other hand, postulates a
metric compatible connection with zero curvature, but non-zero torsion.
The above account makes curvature and torsion, and the connections postu-
lated by GR and TPG, sound pleasantly symmetrical. However, there are some
important asymmetries. As was the case for geodesics, there is more than one
concept of curvature. This comes about because curvature may be defined with-
out making use of the connection. Curvature may be defined as the relative ac-
celeration of neighbouring geodesics. If we use the metrical notion of geodesic,
this does not rely on the connection. Torsion, on the other hand, has no metrical
interpretation; it is purely a property of the connection.
Another important asymmetry concerns the uniqueness of the connection.
While there is a unique symmetric metric-compatible connection for a given met-
ric, demanding metric compatibility and zero torsion fails to uniquely specify a
connection. Teleparallel gravity therefore involves an equivalence class of con-
nections.
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2.1.2 Summary of the formalism
Armed with the above geometrical concepts, we are ready to examine teleparallel
theory. As noted, TPG introduces a connection with torsion, but zero curvature.12
This is called the Weitzenbo¨ck connection. Of course, it is hardly surprising that
such a connection can be defined. What is far more surprising is that the introduc-
tion of the Weitzenbo¨ck connection can lead to a theory of gravity that reproduces
the results of general relativity. In order to understand how this comes about, it is
necessary to move into tetrad notation, which requires further explanation.13
In standard GR, we generally work within the constraints of a coordinate basis
for our tangent space. However, the tetrad formalism allows us to work with an
orthonormal basis. In particular, the components of a tetrad transform between the
coordinate basis and the orthonormal basis. If V is a vector in the tangent space,
and roman and greek indices represent components of vectors in the orthonormal
and coordinate bases respectively, then the tetrad h aµ gives the components of the
coordinate basis vectors in the orthonormal basis:
V a = h aµ V
µ. (20)
Given a non-trivial tetrad field, we can define the Weitzenbo¨ck connection14
given by:
Γρµν = h
ρ
a ∂νh
a
µ (21)
This means that the Weitzenbo¨ck covariant derivative of the tetrad field vanishes
identically, which is the feature that ensures absolute parallelism:
∇νhaµ = ∂νhaµ − Γθµνhaθ = 0 (22)
Teleparallel gravity is an Abelian gauge theory of the translation group. The
gauge potential Baµ is the non-trivial part of the tetrad field:
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haµ = ∂µx
a +Baµ (23)
12This connection is, in fact, metric compatible. However, the metric is not explicitly introduced
in the TPG formalism.
13The account below will be, of necessity, only a sketch. For a fuller account, look at e.g.[4].
14Henceforth the Weitzenbo¨ck connection will be represented by Γ, and the Levi-Civita con-
nection by Γ˚. I will also work in units where c=1.
15Note that this division depends on our choice of coordinates.
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The field strength may be derived from the potential in the usual way, and turns
out to be simply the torsion of the connection written in the tetrad basis:
F aµν = ∂µB
a
ν − ∂νBaµ = haρT ρµν (24)
The action is given by the following integral:
S =
∫ b
a
[−m
√
−u2 +mBαµuαuµ]ds (25)
where ds = (ηabdxadxb)
1
2 is the Minkowski tangent space invariant interval, and
uα is the particle four-velocity. Use of the Euler-Lagrange equations leads to a
force equation analogous to the Lorentz force law:
(∂mux
α +Bamu)
duα
ds
= F aµρuau
ρ. (26)
This can be reexpressed via equations 24 and 25 to give:
duµ
ds
− Γθµνuθuν = Tθµνuθuν , (27)
which is the equation of motion for teleparallel gravity. This predicts deviation
away from the geodesics of the Weitzenbo¨ck connection, and these deviations
depend on torsion, and thus on the field strength of the theory.
2.1.3 Motivation
It is worth pausing here to ask why one might prefer the messier teleparallel theory
to the more elegant general relativistic formulation. TPG aims to reproduce the
results of GR exactly, and thus manifestly fails to have any empirical benefits.
The perceived benefits then, must be theoretical, and I shall try to outline some
possibilities here.
A first possibility concerns the motivation for all gauge theories of gravity, in-
cluding that first suggested by Einstein and Cartan: unification. The overwhelm-
ing success of the gauge heuristic gives good reason to believe that the way for-
wards in the unification programme lies in a fully fledged gauge theory of gravity.
However, unlike Einstein’s version of a teleparallel theory, which was intended
to unify gravity and electromagnetism, modern teleparallel theory simply repro-
duces the results of general relativity, and does not pretend to posit any new results
connecting gravity to other forces. In this case, then, the unificationist motivation
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boils down to a vague conviction that nature has written all her laws in the lan-
guage of gauge theories; it is a methodological unification and not an ontological
one.
A second possible motivation concerns the energy of the gravitational field. In
standard GR, this is represented by the energy-momentum pseudo-tensor of the
gravitational field:t ρλ . In teleparallel gravity, it is now more naturally represented
by the gauge current, j ρa , which is given in equation (34). Andrade, Guillen and
Pereira [4] consider this a major advantage of the theory. They make much of
the fact that this quantity is invariant under local translations of the tangent space
coordinates, and transforms covariantly under global tangent space Lorentz trans-
formations. This means it is both a well-behaved gauge invariant quantity of the
theory (remembering that the gauge group of teleparallel theory is the transla-
tion group), and what they call a “spacetime tensor”.16 This contrasts with the
pseudo-tensorial nature of t ρλ . Moreover, although both the gauge current and the
energy-momentum pseudo-tensor are conserved quantities, this fact can be ex-
pressed with a covariant derivative for the gauge current, but cannot be expressed
covariantly for the pseudo-tensor. This is perhaps an advantage, but hardly reason
enough to abandon GR in favour of teleparallel theory, especially when we note
that j ρa is only covariant under global, and not local, Lorentz transformations.
A final motivation for the theory is a claim, put forwards in two recent papers
by Aldrovandi, Pereira and Vu, [18, 19] that teleparallel gravity may be formulated
in such a way that it remains valid in the face of violation of the weak equivalence
principle (WEP). That is, teleparallel theory could accommodate the discovery
that, for some matter, gravitational and inertial mass are not identical, and that all
bodies do not therefore fall at the same rate regardless of their constitution. Of
course, we have no current reason to think that WEP is violated, and one might
well think that, if TPG loses GR’s ability to explain the validity of the WEP, this
is a disadvantage of the theory. We will return to this issue, and its consequences,
in the final section of this paper.
2.2 Underdetermination
Teleparallel gravity and general relativity appear to be candidates for underdeter-
mination. Is this really the case? As in the Newtonian discussion, this rests on
whether they are really empirically equivalent, and whether they propose differ-
16This term is just another way of expressing the covariance under global Lorentz transforma-
tions.
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ent ontologies. However, the issues here are slightly more complicated than in the
Newtonian case, and, while I’ll argue that we don’t in fact have a case of under-
determination, I will also argue that one of the options available in the Newtonian
case, insisting that the two theories represented different inertial structures and
provided different predictions, is not available here.
First, we need to understand the results that lead to the claim that TPG is
empirically indistinguishable from GR. The Lagrangian for a pure gravitational
field may be written in the following notation:17
LG = h
16piG
SρµνTρµν (28)
where h = det(haµ), and:
Sρµν =
1
2
[Kµνρ − gρνT σµσ + gρµT σνσ] (29)
with Kµνρ being the contortion tensor:
Kρµν =
1
2
[
T ρµ ν + T
ρ
ν µ − T ρµν
]
(30)
How does this lead to empirical equivalence? It turns out that the contortion
tensor defined above is simply the difference between the Weitzenbo¨ck connection
and the Levi Civita connection:
Γ˚ρµν = Γ
ρ
µν −Kρµν (31)
Given that Kρµν is built up from the torsion, which is the field strength of
the theory, the parallel with equation (15), which gave the relationship between
the Newton-Cartan and Newtonian connections, is obvious. In fact, the above
seems to represent a gravity/inertia split in much the same way that equation (15)
does. This relation is also essential in establishing the empirical equivalence of
TPG and GR, because it acts as a translation dictionary between the equations of
teleparallel gravity and those of standard general relativity. Given this translation,
17I use the vacuum lagrangian and field equations here for ease of exposition. The presence
of a source field adds an extra term to the lagrangian, and results in the presence of the energy-
momentum tensor on the right-hand side of the field equations
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the Lagrangian above turns out to be identical, up to a divergence, to the Einstein-
Hilbert Lagrangian in standard GR:18
L = h
16piG
√−gR˚ (32)
The vacuum field equation can likewise either be translated into the language
of teleparallel gravity, or alternatively obtained by performing variations with re-
spect to the gauge potential. It turns out to be:
∂σ (hS
σρ
a )− 4piG (hj ρa ) = 0 (33)
where j ρa is the gravitational gauge current:
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hj ρa ≡
∂L
∂haρ
= − c
4
4piG
hh λa S
νρ
µ T
µ
νλ + h
ρ
a L (35)
This quantity is conserved as a result of the field equations:
Dρj
ρ
a = 0 (36)
This is enough to establish empirical equivalence, but we may, at this stage,
begin to have some doubts about TPG’s status as an original and coherent theory.
In the above equation, Dρ is the so-called teleparallel covariant derivative, not
the Weitzenbo¨ck covariant derivative. The teleparallel covariant derivative is sim-
ply the Levi-Civita covariant derivative reexpressed in terms of the Weitzenbo¨ck
connection via equation 32:
Dρj
ρ
a ≡ ∂ρj ρa + (Γρλρ −Kµλρ)j λa (37)
18Although this certainly guarantees the empirical equivalence of the two theories locally, we
might have some global worries. There are certain topological solutions to the Einstein equations
that do not admit of a global tetrad field. As a result, it appears that there must be some GR
solutions that cannot be instantiated in TPG. Of course, this also applies to any formulation of GR
using tetrads, not just TPG.
19j ρa may be compared to the standard GR energy-momentum pseudo-tensor of the gravita-
tional field, which can be expressed in our notation as:
ht ρλ =
c4h
16piG
ΓµνλS
νρ
µ + δ
ρ
λLG (34)
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Thus the gravitational gauge current is not conserved with respect to the con-
nection most natural to the theory, but rather with respect to the Levi-Civita con-
nection. The importance of the teleparallel covariant derivative does not stop
there. The minimal coupling principle applies in TPG just as it does in GR. In or-
der to maintain empirical equivalence, however, ordinary derivatives are converted
not into the Weitzenbo¨ck covariant derivative, but into the teleparallel covariant
derivative.20 We shall see shortly that this has important consequences for the
inertial frames picked out by TPG.
So far we have not mentioned the metric. In teleparallel gravity, this is quite
possible; it does not appear in the formalism of the theory. Nonetheless, it is worth
noticing that it has been hiding in the shadows all along, closely tied to the tetrad
field:
gµν = ηabh
a
µh
a
ν , (38)
where ηab is the Minkowski metric. In fact, gµν is still used to raise and lower
indices, just as it is in GR.
One might therefore have doubts that teleparallel gravity really postulates a
different ontology; the old entities from GR appear to be waiting in the wings. I
suggested in the Newtonian case that, under circumstances in which non-gravitational
phenomena failed to determine the gravity/inertia split, we should regard Newto-
nian mechanics as postulating the same spacetime structure as Newton-Cartan the-
ory. Equation 32, like equation 15, postulates a split between gravity and inertia
that constitutes the purported ontological difference between TPG and GR. Might
we have reason here, as in the Newtonian case, not to take this split seriously?
Might TPG not really be a force theory?
Let us briefly review the reasons to view TPG as a force theory, and thus as on-
tologically divergent from GR. Proponents of TPG claim that equation 26 is anal-
ogous to the Lorentz force law, and that the equation of motion, 27, predicts devi-
ations from inertial motion in a gravitational field. This is because freely falling
particles are predicted to travel on paths that are not geodesics of the Weitzenbo¨ck
connection. The fact that the theory admits of the kind of gauge formulation that
results in something like the Lorentz force law is certainly suggestive. However,
when we dig a little deeper, the precise analogy with Yang-Mills gauge theories
begins to fall apart. Teleparallel theory proposes a Minkowskian tangent bundle
on the base space R4. The gauge group of the bundle is the translation group,
and the gauge potential is the non-trivial part of the tetrad field. This bundle is
a tangent bundle, unlike the fibre bundle of standard gauge theories, which are
20See [3].
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internal vector bundles. As such, the teleparallel gauge theory has a definitively
spatiotemporal flavour. In fact, it is worth noting that the torsion tensor itself is a
peculiarly spatiotemporal entity. Torsion can only be defined for a connection on
the tangent bundle; one way of seeing this is to note that there is no analog of a
coordinate basis for an internal vector space, and therefore tetrad fields, and the
torsion tensor cannot be defined on internal bundles.
All this is suggestive, but hardly conclusive. Much more worrying questions
about the force-like nature of TPG arise when we consider the inertial structure
supposedly defined by the Weitzenbo¨ck connection. A force is only a force in as
much as it leads bodies to move off geodesics, or, equivalently, to deviate from
an inertial path. As such, it is defined relative to the local inertial structure. It
is therefore essential to ask relative to which frames TPG represents gravity as a
force. The answer might seem simple: relative to those frames defined with re-
spect to the Weitzenbo¨ck connection. But which frames are these? They can’t be
defined in the normal way as the frames in which the components of the connec-
tion vanish, because no such frames exist for a non-symmetric connection.21 If we
insist that gravity is a force, we appear to have no inertial frames in teleparallel
gravity! The geodesics of the Weitzenbo¨ck connection simply don’t have a full
inertial structure associated with them.
Is TPG therefore a theory without inertial structure, and therefore without full
spacetime structure? Perhaps not. As noted in section 1.1, the minimal coupling
prescription in TPG uses the teleparallel covariant derivative (which is simply a
recasting of the Levi-Civita covariant derivative), and not the Weitzenbo¨ck covari-
ant derivative. As a result, all other fundamental forces take their simplest form
relative to the inertial frames picked out by the Levi-Civita connection. Moreover,
freely falling bodies still follow geodesics of the metric, which, along with the
Levi-Civita connection, is still present in the theory, albeit in disguised form. It
therefore seems most sensible to conclude that the spacetime of TPG is in fact
precisely the same as the one in GR; only the mathematical form is different.
This conclusion becomes still more compelling when we note that neither the
Weitzenbo¨ck connection nor the tetrad field are uniquely determined by the theory.
The tetrad field is defined only up to a local gauge transformation, and this gauge
freedom passes on to the connection defined in terms of the tetrads. As a result,
the gravity/inertia split expressed in equation 32 is just as much a gauge matter as
it was in the Newtonian case. In fact, the situation is worse. Because the tetrad
21To see this, note that the antisymmetric part of the connection forms a tensor, and therefore
its components cannot be made to vanish by a coordinate transformation.
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field is subject to a local gauge freedom, no amount of information about the
tetrad field on, say, a spacelike hypersurface will determine the value of the tetrad
field in other regions of spacetime. As a result, it is tempting to think that the
metric, and the Levi-Civita connection, should be taken as ontologically prior to
the tetrad field and Weitzenbo¨ck connection.
Both TPG and GR appear to take the metric to be fundamental. Looked at
another way, we can note that both theories admit of both the tetrad field and
the metric; the tangent space can be given an orthonormal basis in GR, just as
it can in TPG. Moreover, rods and clocks survey the self-same metric in both
theories. The only difference is the way in which this comes about - either via
the Weitzenbo¨ck connection, or the Levi-Civita connection. It seems that both
theories posit the ‘same’ spacetime; if the connections in the two theories are
thought of as modeling properties of this spacetime, they should perhaps be seen
as alternative representations of the same properties. The closer we look, the less
there appears to be any underdetermination at all.
However, this does present us with a puzzle. Torsion and curvature represent
very different geometrical properties. How then, can TPG and GR be interpreted
identically? This query becomes more pressing when we note that there are vari-
ants on General Relativity which postulate connections with both torsion and cur-
vature, each playing different roles. In Poincare´ gauge theories, the torsion and
curvature represent translational and lorentz gauge field strengths respectively.
These then couple to different fields, and have markedly different effects. While
the curvature of the connection plays its traditional role in General Relativity; cou-
pling to all matter fields, torsion, at least at the macroscopic level, couples only to
fields with spin.22 Prima facie, then, we would expect very different theories to be
produced by postulating connections with only torsion and curvature respectively.
However, perhaps the analogy with Poincare´ gauge theory is misleading. The
equations of TPG are set up in such a way that the torsion of the connection plays
a very different role from that in Poincare´ gauge theories. In particular, despite
being broadly associated with spin in the non-teleparallel literature,23 torsion has
no such association in teleparallel theory; given the equations, the effects of the
Weitzenbo¨ck connection on matter must in every way match the effects of the
Levi-Civita connection. That identical physical effects can be modeled either by a
connection with curvature or one with torsion is truly remarkable, but not because
22For more details of Poincare´ gauge theories, see, for example,[12] or [11]
23[12] justifies this association by suggesting that the spins of particles act like tiny gyroscopes
which detect the translational field.
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there is any necessary link between torsion and particular particles or effects. The
fact that the role of torsion in similar theories can be so different teaches us that
interpreting a theory involves more than just looking at its mathematical form. In
this case, we can only understand the theory by thinking hard about the inertial
structure it posits. Despite appearing to possess very different geometrical mean-
ings, given the right laws, connections with torsion and curvature can have the
same physical effects.
2.3 Alternative Inertial Structure?
The above discussion closes with a stronger conclusion than in the Newtonian
case. What has happened to our two universes and our second interpretative
option? If (32) represents a gravity/inertia split, can’t we imagine a situation
in which non-gravitational phenomena suggested that teleparallel gravity repre-
sented the more natural spacetime theory? Is there no GR analog of Universe
B?
The difference between Universe A and Universe B lay in the satisfaction of
the equivalence principle. Recall that in GR the strong equivalence principle has
two components: minimal coupling and universality of gravitation. Minimal cou-
pling is maintained in TPG with respect to the Levi-Civita connection, so there is
no reason to think that TPG might correspond to a universe in which minimal cou-
pling is incorrect. In particular, we can’t even consider modifying the theory to a
form with minimal coupling with respect to the Weitzenbo¨ck connection, because
there are no frames in which this connection vanishes, and therefore applying
the comma goes to semi-colon rule with respect to the Weitzenbo¨ck connection
would not give back the pre-GR forms of non-gravitational interactions in any
frame whatsoever. However, there has been a suggestion that teleparallel gravity
might be compatible with a universe in which gravity is not universal, namely one
in which gravitational and inertial mass were not equivalent.
Aldrovandi, Pereira and Vu [18, 19], derive an equation analogous to the
Lorentz force equation which can accommodate different values for gravitational
charge mg, and inertial mass mi. They reproduce the action for TPG, but without
assuming the weak equivalence principle:
S =
∫ b
a
[−midσ −mgBaµuadxµ] (39)
The force equation is now:
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(∂µ +
mg
mi
Baµ)
dua
ds
=
mg
mi
F aµρuau
ρ (40)
where F aµρ is the field strength defined in equation (7). When mg = mi, this
equation reduces to our original equation of motion, and, if we substitute appro-
priately, can be shown to be identical to the geodesic equation of GR. However,
the motions of particles are still well-defined even for mg 6= mi.
What are we to make of this? First we should note that what is being pro-
posed is quite different from my suggestion for Universe B, and much stronger.
I proposed violation of a Newtonian version of the strong equivalence principle;
massless phenomena were to select the geodesics of a flat spacetime. However,
in this case, we have violation of the weak equivalence principle. It is not exactly
clear what massless bodies do according to the above prescription, but it seems
plausible to hold that these bodies, at least, still follow geodesics of the Levi-
Civita connection. It is the behaviour of massive bodies that changes. However,
the change does not help us interpret TPG as a force theory on flat spacetime.
While WEP violation certainly threatens the claim of the Levi-Civita connection
to represent inertial structure, it does nothing to award the Weitzenbo¨ck connec-
tion inertial significance. A theory like the above appears simply to be a theory
without inertial structure at all, and hence without any proper notion of force. It
may be that such notions must go by the wayside in some eventual theory, but it
scarcely seems that TPG is doing any work in showing us this. Given our ability
to translate teleparallel quantities to GR ones, we can always back-engineer the
above equations into GR form.
Thus, when it comes to postulating the a flat spacetime, the analogy between
the general relativistic case and the Newtonian one breaks down. We don’t have
underdetermination in the TPG/GR case, but the sheer complexity of the geomet-
rical form of GR, and the subtlety of the notion of inertial frame within it, restrict
our options. The only coherent spacetime to be found in these theories is the
curved spacetime of GR.
Conclusions
Two morals may be drawn from this discussion. The first is that examples of
theoretical underdetermination are harder to come by than one might think, espe-
cially if one takes a relatively liberal attitude to the metaphysical commitments
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of a theory. Genuine potential examples of underdetermination are scarce; I have
examined two rare examples and found them lacking.
Significantly, the illusion of underdetermination came about as a result of what
John Stachel has called “the fetishism of mathematics”.24 It is only when we
take the mathematical form of the theories too seriously that they appear to di-
verge. Careful consideration of inertial structure revealed that geometrical form
does not always determine a theory’s spatiotemporal commitments. This is the
second moral. We see that geometrical form is not a sufficient condition for rep-
resenting spacetime structure. Inertial considerations play an important role in the
process by which mathematical structure comes by its spatiotemporal credentials.
Moreover, the requirements on our total theory for a particular inertial structure to
be represented are stringent.
The consequences of ignoring the above are apparent in the teleparallel litera-
ture. GR’s geometriziation of gravity is a very deep and subtle matter; we should
be wary of claims that a theory either reverses or extends that geometrization.
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